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The principal can establish institutions or implement campaigns to restrain agent behavior. Conventional wisdom holds that institutions provide the foundation for regularized policy implementation, while campaigns drive ad hoc policy outcomes. The regularized patterns and long-term effects fostered by institutions are more in need than the short-term effects generated by campaigns for consistent and effective governance, making institutions the focal point for solving governance challenges. However, what remains to be explored is how campaigns can enhance institutions in fostering effective policy implementation. We theorize institutions can be ineffective when special interests capture the regulating bureaucracy. In such a case, campaigns are needed to break the capture and improve regulatory outcomes. To test our theory, we examine how local firms in China respond to changes in the mode of air pollution regulation. Using an original and fine-grained firm-level dataset, incorporating comprehensive and confidential statistics used by political and bureaucratic entities in decision-making, we find that higher-contributing firms, which contributed more to local revenues and thus were more favored by the local government and bureaucracy, committed more violations of environmental standards than lower-contributing firms. The worse performance of the higher-contributing firms happened even when their emissions were being actively monitored for compliance with institutional standards. However, after the central government started waging inspection campaigns, higher-contributing firms did not commit more violations. We posit that the threat local firms and officials faced of getting caught and punished by the central environmental authority deterred the higher-contributing firms from committing excess violations and lessened the regulatory capture of the "]],"qPsR":[["https://dartmouth.zoom.us/meeting/register/tJAuf-quqzsrGNYavYEPYbhpkKm6o38HmKQb#/registration",[["a","https://dartmouth.zoom.us/meeting/register/tJAuf-quqzsrGNYavYEPYbhpkKm6o38HmKQb#/registration"]]]],"}iPx":[["When Institutions Need Campaigns for Effective Governance"]],"title":[["APOSS 102 - Shiran Victoria Shen"]]},"created_time":1681152789710,"last_edited_time":1684871100525,"parent_id":"20c09c22-f84d-4bc7-9f4c-f4f4599e4c2b","parent_table":"collection","alive":true,"file_ids":["ea583767-56ce-4555-9751-3d31a47b25cc"],"created_by_table":"bot","created_by_id":"9afc4b8e-69ea-4799-8120-c61a7f111777","last_edited_by_table":"notion_user","last_edited_by_id":"aee5ddd6-fe78-4dec-9963-c2fae733ca31","space_id":"71a28bb7-792b-498d-81e8-e4f63a45ef01"},"role":"reader"},"6e39f173-e997-4e77-bf06-b978c6ef3b56":{"value":{"id":"6e39f173-e997-4e77-bf06-b978c6ef3b56","version":180,"type":"page","properties":{"<_x_":[["HSE University "]],"@HTX":[["April 25, 2023 12:00PM-1:00PM EDT"]],"DSeL":[["Edmund Malesky",[["a","https://sites.duke.edu/malesky/"]]],[" and "],["Duy D. Trinh",[["a","https://duydtrinh.com/"]]]],"Hm>j":[["IMG_4523.png",[["a","https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/secure.notion-static.com/0ea5f965-ed56-4575-b2f2-2c2b3529441f/IMG_4523.png"]]]],"VD<[":[["authoritarianism, institutions, China, leadership succession, nepotism, communism "]],"_Tmt":[["Arguably, party institutions sustain resilient dictatorships. However, it is unclear how certain institutions support regime resilience over time and how some previously successful party institutions cease to be so, leading similar regimes to different survival outcomes. Moreover, the causal mechanism of party institutions’ role in the resilience of single-party regimes has not been examined closely. We investigate this puzzle and propose that party institutions must be studied over the long term. The article shows how nepotism in autocracies has buttressed regime stability devised by conventions adopted at critical junctures to structure elite behavior. Based on institutional analysis of leadership succession in the highly similar single-party regimes in China, Vietnam, and Laos, I argue that political nepotism became a means of institutional reproduction that has allowed Vietnam and Laos to consolidate collegial rule established by regime founders. In contrast, the successful fight against nepotism in China has led to further personalization of the regime. "]],"}iPx":[["Sons of Revolution: Nepotism as a Source of Authoritarian Resilience in the Communist China, Vietnam and Laos"]],"title":[["APOSS 101 - Nikolai Mukhin"]]},"created_time":1673721265258,"last_edited_time":1684871105787,"parent_id":"20c09c22-f84d-4bc7-9f4c-f4f4599e4c2b","parent_table":"collection","alive":true,"file_ids":["0ea5f965-ed56-4575-b2f2-2c2b3529441f"],"created_by_table":"bot","created_by_id":"9afc4b8e-69ea-4799-8120-c61a7f111777","last_edited_by_table":"notion_user","last_edited_by_id":"aee5ddd6-fe78-4dec-9963-c2fae733ca31","space_id":"71a28bb7-792b-498d-81e8-e4f63a45ef01"},"role":"reader"},"2d842fdc-b9c3-4ef6-9dc6-19d2d653a36e":{"value":{"id":"2d842fdc-b9c3-4ef6-9dc6-19d2d653a36e","version":72,"type":"page","properties":{"<_x_":[["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]],"@HTX":[["April 18, 2023 11:00AM-12:00PM EDT"]],"DSeL":[["Songying Fang",[["a","https://profiles.rice.edu/faculty/songying-fang"]]],[" and "],["Jamie Gruffydd-Jones",[["a","https://www.jamiegruffyddjones.com/"]]]],"Hm>j":[["Screenshot 2023-04-18 at 11.42.08 AM(2).png",[["a","https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/secure.notion-static.com/3f1fb814-15d4-4bc0-87f8-64186331c725/Screenshot_2023-04-18_at_11.42.08_AM(2).png"]]]],"VD<[":[["China, International Cooperation, Human rights, Economic Sanction"]],"_Tmt":[["Conventional wisdom holds that the international human rights regime is politicized: despite claiming to uphold the normative standard, states review their allies’ human rights records less harshly than their adversaries’. What strategic move might a major power take after receiving a harsh peer review in the international human rights regime? I demonstrate that China, a major power with little intent to comply with liberal-based norms, can use punishments to influence reviews of its human rights record. Punishments seek to bypass the human rights norms underlying the international monitoring system. Leveraging the time lag between sessions of the UN Universal Periodic Review, a recurring human rights monitoring institution, I show that China uses economic sanctions and reciprocal reviews to deter harsh reviewers. Under such undue pressure, countries economically dependent on China may give lenient reviews in return. In contrast with the conventional wisdom that socialization leads to states’ benign compliance, I specify how a major power can influence other states to resist and bypass norms in a liberal-based international institution. "]],"qPsR":[["https://dartmouth.zoom.us/meeting/register/tJAuf-quqzsrGNYavYEPYbhpkKm6o38HmKQb",[["a","https://dartmouth.zoom.us/meeting/register/tJAuf-quqzsrGNYavYEPYbhpkKm6o38HmKQb"]]]],"}iPx":[["Be My Friendly Reviewers: How China Shapes the Human Rights Regime"]],"title":[["APOSS 100 - Lucie Lu"]]},"created_time":1674835553148,"last_edited_time":1684871115029,"parent_id":"20c09c22-f84d-4bc7-9f4c-f4f4599e4c2b","parent_table":"collection","alive":true,"file_ids":["3f1fb814-15d4-4bc0-87f8-64186331c725"],"created_by_table":"bot","created_by_id":"9afc4b8e-69ea-4799-8120-c61a7f111777","last_edited_by_table":"notion_user","last_edited_by_id":"aee5ddd6-fe78-4dec-9963-c2fae733ca31","space_id":"71a28bb7-792b-498d-81e8-e4f63a45ef01"},"role":"reader"},"1b559bc5-80aa-4f1a-907e-ca6e392655f1":{"value":{"id":"1b559bc5-80aa-4f1a-907e-ca6e392655f1","version":216,"type":"page","properties":{"<_x_":[["Postdoc, Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen"]],"@HTX":[["April 11, 2023 11:00AM-12:00PM EDT"]],"DSeL":[["Alexandre Pelletier, ",[["a","https://alexandrepelletier.weebly.com/"]]],["Ardeth Thawnghmung",[["a","https://www.uml.edu/fahss/political-science/faculty/thawngh-ardeth-maung.aspx"]]],[", and "],["Htet Thiha Zaw",[["a","https://sites.lsa.umich.edu/htzaw/"]]]],"Hm>j":[["Screenshot 2023-04-11 at 9.06.08 AM.png",[["a","https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/secure.notion-static.com/a0242d87-9006-4b33-bfd7-b55a29fa8908/Screenshot_2023-04-11_at_9.06.08_AM.png"]]]],"Q;\\E":[["Megan Ryan, PhD Candidate, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan"]],"VD<[":[["revolution, social media, coalition building, ethnic conflict, inter-communal reconciliation"]],"_Tmt":[["The shock and anger felt by the Myanmar public as they witnessed their democratically elected government deposed in an illegal military coup has led to a revolutionary break in Burmese politics. The Bamar political elites, formerly silent on the Rohingya crisis, issued public apologies and regret; the coup breathed new life and possibilities into the formation of a federal democracy; and young students and strike leaders dared to challenge the dominance of the traditional elites with fresh and more progressive political ideologies for a future Myanmar. However, little is known about whether or how the support for inter-ethnic solidarity has continued to develop since the Myanmar Spring Revolution began. Has the coup itself and people’s experience of participating in the Spring Revolution facilitated increasing trust and solidarity? What structural barriers remain? As many digitally-connected communities across Myanmar took to social media in order to condemn the military and mobilize resistance, studying these groups’ online interactions will provide critical insights into their internal dynamics. By analyzing conversations throughout the one-year period following the coup on three of the most popular resistance groups on Facebook from Bamar and non-Bamar communities, we demonstrate a mixed process comprising both instrumental and organic drivers of inter-ethnic solidarity. Our findings provide a novel contribution to the literature on solidarity-building among diverse anti-dictatorship forces, revolution dynamics in post-coup Myanmar, and the role of social media on forging inter-communal empathy. These issues also have important implications for the possibility of achieving an inclusive and democratic Myanmar in the longer term. "]],"qPsR":[["https://dartmouth.zoom.us/meeting/register/tJAuf-quqzsrGNYavYEPYbhpkKm6o38HmKQb",[["a","https://dartmouth.zoom.us/meeting/register/tJAuf-quqzsrGNYavYEPYbhpkKm6o38HmKQb"]]]],"}iPx":[["Strange bedfellows or genuine comrades? 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In non-democratic regimes, the authorities can flag social media posts as ‘fake’ in order to impede criticism and compromise their opponents’ ability to generate support. However, we know very little about these measures’ effect on online activity and offline public opinion. I propose that the use of fake news labels in nondemocracies is a strategy for nonviolent repression. I argue that when the authorities issue fake news labels, the opposition’s ability to mobilise online is compromised through mechanisms of stigmatisation and self-censorship. Fake news labels can also alienate mass support for the opposition, however, such effects may depend on citizens’ prior political beliefs and preferences for informational sources. In this work, I investigate first, under what conditions non-democratic regimes use fake news labelling as repression and, second, how the use of fake news labels influences online social media activity and offline public opinion towards targeted users. I will draw on evidence from a cross-national dataset of fake news labels from a global sample of nondemocracies and an original survey experiment from Singapore. My findings will provide one of the first tests of the political effects of disinformation labelling. This work expands understanding of online repression’s consequences and audiences and has implications for studies of authoritarian politics."]],"qPsR":[["https://dartmouth.zoom.us/meeting/register/tJAuf-quqzsrGNYavYEPYbhpkKm6o38HmKQb",[["a","https://dartmouth.zoom.us/meeting/register/tJAuf-quqzsrGNYavYEPYbhpkKm6o38HmKQb"]]]],"}iPx":[["“This Post Contains False Information”: How Do non-democratic Governments Use Fake News Labels to Restrict Online Dissent"]],"title":[["APOSS 98 - Yilin Su "]]},"created_time":1674253264023,"last_edited_time":1684871127825,"parent_id":"20c09c22-f84d-4bc7-9f4c-f4f4599e4c2b","parent_table":"collection","alive":true,"file_ids":["e7d7071b-e7e3-46aa-80fa-b4ad8028f858"],"created_by_table":"bot","created_by_id":"9afc4b8e-69ea-4799-8120-c61a7f111777","last_edited_by_table":"notion_user","last_edited_by_id":"aee5ddd6-fe78-4dec-9963-c2fae733ca31","space_id":"71a28bb7-792b-498d-81e8-e4f63a45ef01"},"role":"reader"},"68a8fdb1-ed11-413c-8849-21270721f60f":{"value":{"id":"68a8fdb1-ed11-413c-8849-21270721f60f","version":228,"type":"page","properties":{"<_x_":[["Peking University and Princeton University"]],"@HTX":[["March 8, 2023 \n9-10:00AM JST"]],"DSeL":[["Siyun Jiang",[["a","https://siyunjiang.weebly.com/"]]],[" and "],["Minh Trinh",[["a","https://www.mdtrinh.com/"]]]],"Hm>j":[["img2.png",[["a","https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/secure.notion-static.com/12892d7f-7a5f-4007-a13e-a3fd69d1609c/img2.png"]]]],"VD<[":[["transparency, legal resistance, China"]],"_Tmt":[["A number of authoritarian countries have adopted transparency laws in the 21st century. This study investigates the effect of such transparency on legal resistance in these countries. Existing literature suggests that authoritarian regimes can use courts to regulate local agents, which provides citizens an opportunity to challenge the agents. Does transparency contribute to the frequency and success of their challenges? We analyze original datasets of administrative litigation and transparency regarding local land expropriation in China, using a difference-in-differences design based on a transparency pilot program. We find that transparency encourages citizens to file lawsuits against local governments, but it makes citizens less likely to win. We further show that the perverse effect is driven by local judicial dependence. 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However, whether citizens can successfully challenge the agents is questionable, because the latter may block the resistance when they can influence the channels of resistance. We analyze original datasets of legal resistance and local transparency regarding land exploitation in China, using a difference-in-differences design based on a transparency experiment. We find that while transparency encourages citizens to file lawsuits against local governments, it makes citizens less likely to win. We further show that the perverse effect is driven by local judicial dependence. This study implies mixed effects of transparency on agent monitoring and legal resistance in autocracies. Although transparency provides citizens with information to challenge local governments, it also signals the regime's monitoring, which incentivizes local governments to block the challenges through institution manipulation. 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